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A300 · ATA 27 · Flight Controls

Flight Controls

Draft · under review

Sources: two FAA Airworthiness Directives read in full text from the downloaded Federal Register HTML (AD 2019-18-04, 84 FR 50301; AD 2019-19-07, 84 FR 51955), EASA TCDS EASA.A.172 Issue 08 (1 Feb 2026), and, for context only, NTSB/AAR-04/04 (downloaded PDF). The Airbus AC (A300-600 Rev 13) has no flight-control chapter in its table of contents, and its text layer contains none of these terms (rudder, elevator, aileron, spoiler, slat, flap, stabilizer, flight control). 96 of its 192 PDF pages have no text layer and were not all read; its chapters cover dimensions, ground servicing and similar airport data. This draft is for study only; it is not a maintenance document. Every AD item below is what the AD addresses, not an inspection or maintenance instruction; no interval or compliance time is given. Sub-section numbers 27-20 and 27-40 are this site's grouping, following FAA JASC codes 2720 Rudder Control System and 2740 Stabilizer Control System; the ADs give only code 27 (and 55). Model names are quoted as printed in each source. The two ADs list models in their applicability paragraph; the lists are reproduced where they matter, and no statement is carried from one model to another.

A300 B2/B4 and A300-600 · FAA Airworthiness Directives and EASA TCDS

27-00 General

  • AD 2019-18-04 gives its subject as "Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27, Flight controls; 55, Stabilizers".[1]
  • AD 2019-19-07 gives its subject as "Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27, Flight controls".[2]
  • The Federal Register summaries of both ADs use "Model A300-600 series airplanes" as a collective term for A300 B4-600, B4-600R and F4-600R series airplanes and A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes.[1][2]
  • Both ADs are issued by the FAA and incorporate an EASA AD by reference: EASA AD 2019-0017 dated 29 January 2019 (AD 2019-18-04) and EASA AD 2019-0078 dated 29 March 2019 (AD 2019-19-07). The EASA ADs themselves could not be opened (EASA AD site gave a maintenance page), so only the FAA text is used.[1][2]

27-20 Rudder - rudder servo actuators (AD 2019-18-04)

  • AD 2019-18-04 "addresses" desynchronization of the rudder servo actuators. It supersedes AD 2005-17-14, which had applied to all Airbus A300 series, the A300-600 series and A310 series and had required repetitive tests to detect desynchronization of the rudder servo actuators and adjustment or replacement of the spring rods of the rudder servo actuators, if necessary.[1][1]
  • Applicability as printed in the AD: (1) A300 B2-1A, B2-1C, B2K-3C, B2-203, B4-2C, B4-103 and B4-203; (2) A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-620, B4-622, B4-605R, B4-622R, F4-605R and F4-622R, and A300 C4-605R Variant F; (3) A310-203, -204, -221, -222, -304, -322, -324 and -325. The list therefore includes models of the A300 B2/B4 group, models of the A300-600 group and A310 models; only the models listed are named.[1]
  • Wording of the AD: it refers to "one of the three rudder servo actuators" and to "the two synchronized actuators". The AD does not say whether the two are a fixed pair or the two that remain synchronized after one has desynchronized.[1][1]
  • Unsafe condition addressed: desynchronization of one of the three rudder servo actuators which, combined with an engine failure, could result in loss of the related hydraulic system and could cause loss of one of the two synchronized actuators. The AD says this could create additional fatigue loading and possible cracking of the attachment fittings, and could leave the remaining synchronized actuator unable to maintain the commanded rudder deflection, leading to reduced controllability.[1][1]
  • Parts and locations named: the rudder servo actuators, the attachment fittings (the AD does not say of which part), the fin box and the rudder servo controls. The AD describes the EASA AD as covering repetitive inspections of the rudder servo actuators and related investigative actions that include repetitive inspections of the fin box and rudder servo controls, with repair as a corrective action.[1][1]
  • The previous AD (2005-17-14) is described as also requiring repetitive tests, inspections and analyses of the rudder servo actuators.[1]
  • The AD states it was prompted by reports of desynchronization of the rudder servo actuators.[1]

27-40 Horizontal stabilizer trim - THS actuator lower attachment (AD 2019-19-07)

  • AD 2019-19-07 "addresses" missing parts at the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) actuator ball nut trunnion lower attachment: the THS actuator right-hand spherical bearing and its retaining parts, listed as bolt, tab washer and end cap.[2][2]
  • Applicability as printed: (1) A300 B2-1A, B2-1C, B2K-3C, B2-203, B4-2C, B4-103, B4-203; (2) A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-620, B4-622; (3) A300 B4-605R and B4-622R; (4) A300 F4-605R and F4-622R; (5) A300 C4-605R Variant F; (6) A310-203, -204, -221, -222, -304, -322, -324, -325.[2]
  • The AD quotes the EASA statement (MCAI) that the affected parts were found missing from the THS actuator ball nut trunnion lower attachment "during maintenance on an A300-600 aeroplane". This finding was made on an A300-600; the AD applies to the wider model list above.[2]
  • Design principle quoted from the EASA statement: the THS actuator lower attachment has a fail-safe design with a primary and a secondary load path, which keeps the load path continuous between the horizontal tail plane and the actuator; the primary load path is engaged in particular by the affected parts.[2]
  • Consequence described: with the parts absent, the secondary load path is engaged in flight; it is designed to withstand the full loads only for a limited period. The AD states the condition could lead to THS actuator failure, possibly resulting in loss of control of the airplane.[2][2]
  • Most likely cause stated by EASA and quoted in the AD: human error is the most likely scenario for the missing parts.[2]
  • The Airbus service bulletins named in the quoted EASA statement as providing inspection instructions are A300-27-0206, A300-27-6073 and A310-27-2108. Only their numbers are given; their content is not available here.[2]
  • The AD describes the corrective actions of the EASA AD as including torqueing and securing the bolt with new lockwire, or installing a new dowel, end cap, washer and bolt and securing with new lockwire. This is quoted to show what the AD addresses, not as a procedure.[2]

High-lift devices (TCDS EASA.A.172 Issue 08)

  • The TCDS marks all models named in this section as surrendered.[3]
  • The TCDS describes the A300 B2-200 series (certified models A300B2K-3C, A300B2-202, A300B2-203) as differing essentially from the A300 B2-100 series in "the addition of Krüger flaps at the wing root".[3]
  • The A300 B4-100 series (certified models A300 B4-2C, B4-102, B4-103, B4-120) is described as differing essentially from the A300 B2-100 series in the addition of a fuel tank in the wing centre box, Krüger flaps at the wing root and increased weights.[3]
  • For the A300 B2-320, the weight table prints landing weight "136 000 (1)" and "134 000 (2)" with footnotes "(1): 136 000 kg: slats 16° and flaps 15°" and "(2): 134 000kg: slats 25° and flaps 25°". The wording shows that the TCDS ties the two landing weights to those slat and flap settings.[3]

Context (NTSB report)

  • Level 3, context only. The report concerns an A300-605R (American Airlines flight 587); its section 1.6.2 describes the rudder control system of the A300-600. None of the following is used as a stand-alone technical value, and the only count kept is the report's "three servo controls"; no other number from the report is repeated here.[4]
  • The report lists the rudder control system as comprising the rudder pedals, a rudder trim actuator, a yaw damper actuator and a yaw autopilot actuator (commanding the rudder); pushrods, bellcranks, a tension regulator and cables (transmitting commands); three servo controls, named upper, middle and lower, which operate the rudder; a rudder travel limiter system giving a variable stop that limits pedal travel with increasing airspeed; and a differential unit that sums pilot or autopilot input and yaw damper input.[4]
  • The report states the pedals are linked through pushrods and bellcranks to a cable tension regulator under the cockpit, from which cables run to a rudder control quadrant aft of the pressure bulkhead below the vertical stabilizer, and the quadrant drives bellcranks and rods along the rear spar of the vertical stabilizer to the rudder servo controls.[4]
  • The report states the rudder travel limiter system is controlled by feel and limitations computers and that it uses airspeed data to set the rudder limit; a figure shows the system.[4][4]
  • The report describes the yaw damper functions as Dutch roll damping, turn coordination and engine failure compensation, and says each cylinder of the yaw damper actuator is controlled by a flight augmentation computer.[4]

Kaynaklar

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  1. FAA AD 2019-18-04 — Airbus SAS airplanes (A300-600 included), Issue 84 FR 50301 (2019-09-25) — §(d) p.50303; Summary p.50301; §(k) p.50303; §(b) p.50302; §(c) pp.50302-50303; Discussion p.50301; §(e) p.50303; Related IBR Material p.50301. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-09-25/html/2019-20755.htm · erişim 2026-11-09
  2. FAA AD 2019-19-07 — Airbus SAS airplanes (A300-600 included), Issue 84 FR 51955 (2019-10-01) — §(d) p.51956; Summary p.51955; §(k) p.51957; §(e) pp.51956-51957; §(c) p.51956; Discussion p.51955; §(e) p.51957; Related IBR Material pp.51955-51956. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-01/html/2019-21237.htm · erişim 2026-11-09
  3. EASA TCDS EASA.A.172 — Airbus A300, A310, A300-600, Issue 08 (2026-02-01) — cover p.1; §4 p.13; §6 p.17; §5.3 p.15. https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/17110/en · erişim 2026-11-09
  4. NTSB/AAR-04/04 — In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587, A300-605R N14053, AAR-04/04 (2004-10-26) — §1.6.2 p.18 (PDF p.32); §1.6.2 p.21 (PDF p.35); Figure 7 p.22 (PDF p.36); §1.6.2 p.19, footnote 41 (PDF p.33). https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf · erişim 2026-11-09

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